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VERTICAL SUPPORT.
When A owns land to the centre of the earth, he is under
no duty, as owner of the lower portion. to allow it to sustain in its
natural place, the upper portion of the land. It would be a solecism to speak of a legal duty to one's self. But the ownership of
the lower portion may be separated from that of the upper. B
may own the coal, iron ore, etc., and A may own the superjacent
stratum. Then will emerge the possibility that B will be under
a duty to allow the resistance of his portion of the land to the fall
of A's portion to sustain in its place, A's portion. The cases
sometimes say that'A's land, or A, as owner of it, has a natural
right to the support of the lower strata.' An unfortunate expression. A servitude is said to be imposed by nature.2 All
legal rights are rights which the lawmaker recognizes, and a
"natural" right which he does not recognize, has no significance
for the lawyer, however interesting it may be did it exist, for the
legislator. The right is sometimes said to be a proprietary right
at common law, and not an easement 3 but all that is meant by
this distinction, apparently, is that this right does not "depend
on a supposed grant." " But, why can a grant of this right nfot
be supposed as well as of those rights called easements? When
A conveys the surface, retaining the under strata, why not say
that he impliedly conveys the right to the continuance of ?he
surface in its normal position, as against A or any later grantee?
When A conveys the coal, retaining the surface, why not say that lie

'Coleman v. Chadwick,

So Pa. 8i.
2Robertson v. Coal Co. 172 Pa. 566. The jargon is indulged in, that..a
lower estate owes a support to an upper; as if lands or estates in lan. can
"owe" anything.
3Youghiougheny C. v. Allegheny Bank, 211 Pa. 319, Carlin v. Chaapat,
xoi Pa. 348. *
4
Youghiogheny Co. v. Allegheny Bank, 21 T Pa. 39 .

THE FORUM
reverses or excepts the right of support? But, the name is unimportant. The right has most of the essential properties of an
easement. It is a right to the abstinence by the owner of the
mine, or other lower stratum, from acts within his mine, that will
affect the place of the upper stratum. It is a limit upon the
usual powers of an owner, for the advantage of the owner of a
superjacent piece of land. Superjacency cannot be importantly
different, in this respect from adjacency. But this is enough to
say on a purely verbal question.
ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT.

Enough has been said to indicate that the right is not based
on express contract or grant. It is asserted to exist whenever an
upper and a lower segment of the earth fall into the ownership
of different persons, irrespective of any intention on the part of
either, contractually expressed, that it shall exist. The right of
support to the surface does not depend on any special mode in
which the division in ownership between it and the inferior
stratum has arisen. The owner of the land may have sold the
surface, retaining the coal, 5 orhe may have sold the coal, retaining
the surface. The division may have occurred by partition proceedings in the orphans' court, one heir taking the coal and
another the superficies. 6
THE RIGHT EXTINGUISHABL.H.

The right may by act of the owners of the superior and inferior strata, be prevented from coming into existence, or being
iW existence, may be extinguished. In the act, e. g. of conveying the coal to B, A may stipulate that he shall be under no duty
to support the surface which A retains; or, B having already
owed this duty, A may release it. The only controversy on this
point has been whether the parties have prevented the right of
support from arising or have put an end to it. This right may
be bargained away like any other right.7 But a waiver or release
of the right will not be discovered in phrases which do not necessarily import it. 8 A grant or reservation by A who owns both
5

Lowry v. Hay, 2 Walker, 239; Jones v. Wagner, 66 Pa. 429. Hornerv.

Watson, 79 Pa. 242; Coleman v. Chadwick,8o Pa. 81.
"Jones v. Wagner, 66 Pa. 429.
-Williams v. Hay, 120 Pa. 485; McDade v. Spencer, 6 Lack. L. N. 84.
8
Robertson v. Coal Co. 172 Pa. 566.
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coal and surface, of "all the coal" 9 all the merchantable coal"
all the workable coal!' does not release the right to the support of
the surface. A conveyance by the owner of land of all the merchantable coal in it "except five acres of the D bed of coal, underlying the buildings and spring" conveys none of the coal within
the five acres, and retains the right to the support of the surface
over the remainder of the coal. 2 A grant of the coal, "and all
the privileges necessary for the convenient working, running and
transportation of said coal, and deposition of excavated matter,
and also all rights and privileges incident or usually appurtenant
to the working and using of coal mines" does not release surface
support. 3 The owner of land grants the surface, reserving the
coal, by a deed containing the words "Provided, however, that
the said grantor, his heirs and assigns in mining and removing
the coal, iron ore and minerals aforesaid, shall do as little damage
to the surface as possible." The grantor reserves certain surface
rights, such as the right to go upon the surface to make explorations for the minerals, to bore holes, sink shafts and drifts, make
roads, and erect structures for taking out the coal. The doing
"as little damage as possible" in the deed, referred to these
things. It would be a strained interpretation that would make
this language take away the right to surface support."
KNOWIEDGE OF MINING OPERATIONS.

One who becomes the owner of the surface by contract with

the owner of the entire land, does not waive his right to surface
support, because he knows his grantor is intending to mine the
coal, nor because when the contract was made the grantor informed
him that the mining would let down the surface several feet, the
deed, made later: ontaining no reference to the surface support,
or the prosecution of mining, 5 nor does the purchaser waive it,
9
Carlin v. Chappel, iox Pa, 348; Robertson v. Coal Co.
Barnes v. Berwind, 3 Penny. 140.

172

Pa. 566.

1uWeaver v,Berwind-White Coal Co. 216 Pa. 195.
"Nelson v. Hoch, x4 Phila. 655. The grant required the grantee to
have proper and sufficient gangways, breasts and supports.
12Weaver v. Berwind-White Coal Co., 216 Pa. s95; Emerson v. Schoonmaker, 135 Pa. 437.
"3Coleman v. Chadwick, 8o Pa. 81.
14Williams v. Hay, i2o Pa. 485.
"Lowry v. Hay,

2 Walk. 239.
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because he knows that the owner of the coal below,, is mining
6
under the adjacent tract.'
EFFECTIVE RELEASES.

The right to support is waived when A accepts a contract
for the sale of land "excepting all the coal beneath the surface"
with the exclusive eight to mine and remove the same, A agreeing to give a full and unconditional release and discharge forever
from all liability for any injury that may result to the surface
from the mining and removing of the coal. A subsequent vendee
(a church) of A, takes the land subject to the duty of giving
this release, and it is a release from the duty of furnishing a support.
If A contracts to sell the coal, the contract saying nothing
concerning a release, and before the deed is made, A sells the surface to X, X will not be affected by the agreement, made later and
inserted in A's deed for the coal, to the vendee, to the effect that A
will release the coal grantee of all liability for the taking out of all
the coal.'" A lease of all the coal with the right to remove it
until all merchantable coal has been mined and removed, the
lessor agreeing that the lessee "shall not be liable for any falling
in of any part or parts or all of the surface in consequence of the
mining and removing of all of the coal, and the said lessor shall
indemnify the lessee against any liability for any falling in of
any surface of any lots in said demised premises, the surface of
which may have been sold by said lessor," waives the right to
surface support." A release by the grantor or lessor of the coal,
after he has sold portions or all of the surface, will not release
the lessee of the coal from his duty to support the surface, as
respects these earlier vendees.2 " But it seems that if A, after
selling the surface to B, sells or leases the coal to C, he may
bindingly guarantee C against any liability to b, for withdrawing
support from the surface, 2 ' and a guarantee against any liability
"6Nelson v. Hoch, 14 Phila. 655. But if when the conveyance of the coal
is made, there is a parol agreement that all the coal may be taken out without
liability for damage to the surface, and this agreement is enforceable, the
grantor, and one who subsequently acquires the surface from him,with notice
from the coal-grantee's possession, will be bound by it, Heckscher v.
Sheaffer, io Sadler, 221.
' 7Scranton v. Phillips, 95 Pa. 15.
"'Barnes v. Berwind, 3 Penny. 140.
"'Miles v. Penna. Coal Co-, 114 Pa. 544.
2
Heckscher v. Sheafer, io Sadler, 221.
1
Miles v. Penna. Coal Co. 214 Pa. 544.
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for damage to the surface, which may result by reason of the
skilful and careful mining and taking away of the coal, will entitle the grantee of the coal to indemnity for damages which he
has had to pay on account of the disturbance of the surface by
his mining operations. The words "skilful and careful mining"
do not refer to the allowing of sufficient support, but to the manne; of working the coal. They do not impose on the covenantee
the duty of leaving sufficient support to the surface.2" A grant of
the surface excepting and reserving all coal, ore and minerals of
every kind, contained in and under the lot conveyed with the
right of the grantor (a corporation) their successors and assigns
to move and take away the same without making any compensation to the grantee for any effect upon or injury to the surface or
buildings thereon, precludes a recovery by the grantee for any
injury to the surface from the process of mining, whether it be
negligent or not."
CUSTOM.
A custom in a region of country, of mine-owners to take out
all the coal, even if subsidence of the surface results would not
be valid unless so old that the memory of man runs not to the
contrary thereof. In Pennsylvania, there is no custom of that
duration."
But, even an ancient custom of this character would
be unreasonable. It is not reasonable that a right which the law
grants, as of common right, should be, not merely modified, but
abrogated, by usage.'
COVENANTS.
A covenant in the deed for the land, which excepts and
reserves to the grantor the coal and minerals, and the exclusive privilege of mining them, and for this purpose, of extending
such tunuels, drifts or excavations as shall be necessary or convenient, "subject to the condition that the surface earth covering
such coal or other minerals, shall not be in any manner cut,
broken'or displaced; and that every damage which may be done
to the lot, or the buildings erected thereon, by the exercise of
the mining privileges herein reserved, shall be made good by the
said grantor," does not modify the grantor's liability as operator
22

Youghiogheny Co. v. Allegheny Bank, 211 Pa. 319.
'Madden v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co. 212 Pa. 63.
21Jones v. Wagner, 66 Pa. 429.
2Horner v. Watson, 79 Pa. 242; Coleman v. Chadwick, 8o Pa, 81; McDade
v. Spencer, 6 Lack. L. N. 84
2

6
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or miner. Says Dean J., it "neither expressly nor impliedly
relieved the covenantor or its lessees from the duty of leaving sufficient support for the surface. It is little more than a reservation
of the coal for itself and assigns, and a stipulation for the performance of a common law duty on its part and that of its assigns." 2 The grantor Qf the surface may covenant with his
grantee, his heirs and assigns, that the "earth covering suchcoal
and other minerals, shall not be in any manner cut broken or displaced, and that every damage [resulting from the mining operations] shall be made good.2"
THE NATURE OV THE RIGHT.

Until recently, it seems to have been supposed by the courts,
that the right to support so-called, was a right that the surface
should not change its place, nor the various parts of it change
their places relatively to each other, in consequence of the removal
of the supports furnished by nature, or they being removed, the
omission to supply effectual substitutes. The right was complex,
not that there should be no removal of natural support, nor that
there should be no such removal without supplying artificial support, nor that the surface should not fall, crack, etc., but that
the surface should not fall in consequence of the removal without
substitution, of the natural supports. Removal until fall of the
surface was no violation of right. It is often stated that the
cause of action, the tort for which damages are recoverable, is the
lapse of the soil.'
In Noonan' v. Pardee 9 however the principle
of the decision, by the House of Lords in Bonomi v. Backhouse
that the cause of action is the falling in, in consequence of the
removal of the supports, and consequently, that the statute of
limitation does not bar an action until six years from the date of
the falling in, however long before the excavation may have been
made, is repudiated. "When the coal was removed" says Dean J.
"without leaving sufficient pillars, or without supplying sufficient
artificial props, was the time when the subjacent owner failed in
an absolute duty he owed to his neighbor. And from that dates
the cause of action." The rizght which is then violated, is not
26
Noonan v. Pardee, 200 Pa. 474.
2

,Hill v. Pardee, 143 Pa. 98.
2Lowry v. Hay, 2 Walk. 239, Pantell v. Coal & Iron Co. 18 Super. 341.
The "injury" is said to be, by Paxson J., "subsidence of the surface," the
"result of not leaving sufficient props to support it." Williams v. Hay, 120
Pa. 485.
92oo

Pa. 474.
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the right to the non-displacement of the surface, but to the nonremoval of the coal or other support without supply of other.
Possibly a similar view was obscurely entertained by the court
in McGowan v. Bailey,' in which it was held not to be error for
the trial court to tell the jury that they might allow for the
"damage that has been actually suffered, and the damage likely to
be suffered from the [past] removing of the supports." The
practical conclusion however that Dean J. draws from the doctrine
that the removal of support is the cause of action, is the breach
of duty, is simply that the statute of limitation will run from
that removal. He does not say, as he logically should, that the
owner of the superficies may sue instantly upon the removal and before any falling in of it. On the contrary he says that the right to
sue, is "fixed," whatever that may mean, by the future subsidence. He even says that the right to sue, from the nature of the
case, cannot prior the the subsidence, have "more than a doubtful existence." It is entirely clear that there can never be a
recovery for an alleged breach of a right, while the existence of
.the right to sue is doubtful. He even says that while the cause
of action arises with the removal of the support, no one "suffers"
then. One only suffers when there is a cave-in, and he is not
the one who owns when the support is removed, or who becoming owner later, in turn parts with the ownership before the
cave-in. He only sustains damage who owns when the subsidence occurs. If that is so, the mere removal of support, is
damnum absque injuria, and yet it is a violation of a right! It
is only the subsidence consequent on the removal that is
damnum cur i~jzurz; that is, that is actionable. And so we come
back to the principle which seemed to be repudiated, that there
can be no successful suit, and therefore3 there is no breach of duty,
unless and until there is a subsidence. '
'146 Pa. 572.

The court may however have meant simply that when

some displacement of the surface has occurred, suit may be brought [though
not before] but being brought, damages could be recovered therein for subsidences happening since the bringing of the suit but by reason of the
removals of support that had occurred before suit. This is the interpretation of Pantall v. Coal & Iron Co. 18 Super. 34.
31

in Pantall v. Coal & Iron Co., 204 Pa. t58, it is repeated after Noonan

v. Pardee, that the cause of action is the removal of support, and not the

consequent subsidence. See the thorough and drastic criticism of Noonan
v. Pardee, in the Forum for March and April 1907, by Prof. Joseph P.
McKeehan.
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CASUAL RELATION BETWEEN SUBSIDENCE AND

xCAVATION.

Subsidence caused by earthquake or other natural causes,
would not give an action to the owner of the surface against the
owner of the inferior strata. The defendant must have caused
it. But, it may be the result of diggings. excavations, removals
of support of several persons through a considerable period of
time. A's diggings may precede B's, and B's, C's. A's diggings
alone, may not cause the cave-in, nor B's alone, nor C's alone.
But, the addition of C's work to B's and A's may precipitate the
surface. In that case C would be liable. "If" said Dean J.,
defendant has done additional mining by removal of coal left in
previous work, or by robbing of pillars within six years before
suit, and without such additional mining the surface would not
have subsided during the plaintiff's occupancy, yet if such additional work or mining hastened the result, the defendant is answerable in damages.""
NEGLIGENCE.

It is not necessary that the defendant should have been
negligent in his excavation or mining in order to be liable when
his work causes a subsidence of the surface,33 or perhaps, as is
sometimes said, the taking away of all the support or of so much
that what is left is insufficient, without substitution of artificial
props, pillars, etc., is i5so facto negligent; 4 or the caving in is
itself conclusive proof of negligence. " Hence inquiry into the
goodness or badness of the mining is irrelevant.36 It is irrelevant
to show that the mining has been done skilfully and according to
the method of mining approved in the bituminous coal region, in
which the mine in question is situated. So is the fact that the
surface was light, the rock rotten and broken and that it would
be impossible to take out the coal without some injury to the
surface."
Indeed it is said that the mine owner must leave every
pound of the coal untouched if its removal will lead to the break32

Noonan v. Pardee, 200 Pa. 474.
:'Lowry v. Hay, 2 Walker 239; Pringle v. Vesta Coal Co., 172 Pa. 438;
Hill v. Pardee, 143 Pa., 98, Rice, P. J.; Youghiogheny Co. v. Allegheny
Bank, 211 Pa. 319.
31Jones v. Wagner, 66 Pa. 429; Williams v. Hay, i2o Pa, 485.
35
Gumbert v. Kilgore, 4 Sadler 84.
3
Noonan v. Pardee, 200 Pa. 474; Hill v, Pardee, Rice, P. J., 143 Pa. 98.
:ITRobertson v. Coal Co., 172 Pa: 556.
-"Noonan v. Pardee, 200 Pa, 474; Youghougheny v. Allegheny Bank,
233 Pa. 319.
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ing of the surface.'
"Ordinary precautions" against injury are
such as actually prevent injury to the surface. If C who has already sold the surface, leases the coal to B, covenanting that all
damages resulting from the mining and removal of the coal shall
be waived by C, provided that B shall take all "ordinary precautions," C will not be liable to indemnify B, if B by removing
the coal has caused the surface to cave in, and damages have been
recovered against him by the owner of the surface. In causing
the cave-in, B has ipsofacto not adopted "ordinary precautions. "9
ACTUAL SUPPORT.

Sometimes the courts say that the owner of the inferior
stratum, owes to the superior, "actual support," not care in
order to prevent or avoid a falling in: not working the mine in
the best imaginable way,"0 not leaving such support as would
ordinarily stistain the surface."1 At times the duty is described
as one of "absolute support.""2 The mining must be so conducted
that the surface will not in fact be injured."
THE USE OF SUBSTITUTES.

The support to the surface the duty of maintaing which is
imposed on the owner of the subterranean stratum, may be furni~hed by pillars of coal left standing here and there in the mine,
by rocks. But, if the miner can and does supply artificial supports that will in fact preserve the surface from break or subsidence, he is permitted to withdraw all the coal." The wrong of
the defendant, then, is not complete when he takes out all the
coal; it becomes- complete when he fails to supply a substitute
But this failure may continue from day to day. Is he then committing a tort each day, in refraining from furnishing artificial
9Coal Co. vs. Hopkins, 198 Pa. 343.
Gumbert v. Kilgore, 4 Sadler, 84.
tCarlin v. Chappel, ioi Pa. 348; Horner v. Watson, 79 Pa. 242; Wil-

40

liams v. Hay, 120 Pa, 485.

42Youghiogheny Co. v. Allegheny Bank, 211 Pa. 319; Weaver v. Berwind-White Coal Co., 216 Pa. 195.
4Barnes v. Berwind, 3 Penny 140.
44Gumbert v. Kilgore, 4 Sadler 84; Coal & Iron Co. v. Taylor, i Foster
361; Noonan v. Pardee, 200 -Pa. 474; Nelson v. Hoch, 14 Phila. 655; Barnes
v. Berwind, 3 Penny 14o; Williams v. Hay, 120 Pa. 485; Hill v. Pardee, 143
Pa. 98; McGowan v. Bailey, 146 Pa., 572; Coleman v. Chadwick, 8o Pa. 81.

10
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support? This failure seems to be regarded as confined to the
time of the withdrawal of the natural support. 5
WHO CAN SUE.

Only the person whose right is violated can sue on account
of the breach of it. Two persons not having a joint interest of
some sort in the surface, can not have the right of support. But,
there may be successive owners of the surface. Which of them
can sue? The one who owns it when the support is removed?
Or any later owner, during whose ownership a subsidence has not
occurred? Or any who becomes owner after a subsidence ? Or
he who owns when the subsidence occurs? "The right to use"
says Dean J. "passes to the surface owner who is in possession
when the subsidence occurs without regard to the date of his
conveyance." 46 The right to obtain compensation even for a removal of support that has already occurred, passes, in a ghostlike state, to successive owners of the land, until a subsidence
actually occurs. After that, doubtless, it ceases to be assignable
with the land.
WHO MAY BE SUED.

Can the person who owns the inferior estate, at the time of
the lapse of the surface, be sued, because he thus owns it? When
th6 support was improperly withdrawn X may have owned the
mine, and directed or caused the withdrawal. X may since have
sold the mine to Y, and later Y fnay have conveyed it to Z.
While Z is owner, but without any act of his to produce the fall,
the surface may cave in. Is Z liable? If the right to sue may
pass from owner to owner of the dominant estate, the surface,
can the liability to be sued pass from owner to owner of the servient estate, the coal or other minerals? The answer is reasonably distinct. Only the person who caused the removal of the
support, not his successor in the ownership of the mine, is liable."
Ordinarily a lessor is not liable for acts of the lessee; and it is
therefore primafacieerror to unite the landlord and tenant of a
coal mine, as co-defendants."
But the lessor may in his lease
have required a form of mining inconsistent with the support of
the surface; he may have retained the right to direct the mining,
45

Noonan v. Pardee, 2oo Pa. 474.

46

Noonan v. Pardee, 200 Pa- 474.
"Emerson v. Schoonmaker, 135 Pa. 437; Noonan v. Pardee,
4 Hill v. Pardee, 143 Pa. 98.

200

Pa. 474.
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and so made himself solely, or jointly with the tenant, liable.49
The lessor of the coal who has retained the surface may be the
plaintiff, and the lessee the defendant.'
In Williams v. Hay,"'
a husband and wife were originally joint defendants. The plaintiff was allowed to amend the record by striking out the name of
the -wife.
INJUNCTION.

The possibility that in the mining operations supports of the
surface will be taken away, is recognized as having a tendency
to detract from the market value of the surface. "It is not improbable," says Dean J. "that this risk enters largely into the
commercial value of all like surface land in that region."
He
thinks that buyers of the surface, in view of this risk, pay a correspondingly lower price for it. 2 It might seem to follow from
this that having thus been compensated in advance for the risk,
the owner of the surface should not be again compensated when
the risk is converted into an actuality. This is not a view which
prevails. If the possibility of the effects of improper mining
lessens the value of the surface, still clearer is it that when the
improper mining has occurred, but before a cave-in has followed,
the expectancy of such cave-in will be keen, and its effect on
market value grave. There is no case in which c6mpensation
has been given for the depreciation of value, during the interval
between the removal of the support, and the subsidence. The
court may however, enjoin against an ablation of the supports,
which would endanger a house in which people live.53 A preliminary injunction was refused in Miles v. Pennsylvania Coal Company" because (a) there had been a release of the right of support, and (b) the major part of the undivided interest both in
the mine and in the surface was owned by the same person, and
the plaintiffs held but a small interest in the surface, and the
injury caused by an injunction would probably be greater than
the advantage gained by it.
19Kistler v. Thompson, x58 Pa. 139; Coal Co. v. Tamaqua, i Walker
468. Both lessor and lessee were sued jointly in Scranton v. Phillips, 99
Pa. 15.
5OEmerson v. Schoonmaker, 135 ;Pa. 437 Lowny v. Hay, 2 Walker 239.
51i2o Pa. 485.
5
'Noonan v. Pardee, 2oo Pa. 474.
•:Nelson v. Hoch, 14 Phila., 655, Cf. Coagan v. Sheafer, cited in this
case. Also, Heckscher v. Sheafer, mo Sadler 22!.
5'214 Pa. 544.
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THE ACTION OF TRESPASS.

,The injury to the owner of the superjacent soil, by the removal of the supports is said to be "of a consequential nature,
being the subsidence of the surface," and for this reason, the
former remedy for it was action of trespass in the case.' Since
the practice act-of 1887, it is trespass.
MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS.

If A owns 100 acres of surface, and B, the owner of the coal
below, removes the supports from the entire tract, can A bring
one action for the removal of the support of one acre, another for
the removal of the supports under a second acre, and another for
the removal of the supports under a third acre? What has been
said leaves doubtful whether any suit can be brought until the
abstraction of the pillars and supports has produced some subsidence. Let us suppose then, that the supports have been withdrawn from the whole 100 acres; and that subsidences have
occurred under one of these acres. Must the suit then be, not
merely for the taking away of the supports under this acre, and
the consequent subsidence, or must it be for the ablation of all
the supports under the 100 acres; or rather, if it is not for this
ablation of all, but only of a part, can a second action be brought
for an ablation from another part? In Williams v. Hay's A owned
two surface tracts, one of 42 acres and another, touching the
first, of 241 acres. In 1883 A sued B, C, and D for causing subsidences in certnrin portions of the 42 acre tract and obtained
damages. In 1885, A sued B and C for causing subsidences
under both tracts. The court said that it was impossible to say
that the first recovery was a bar to the second action, because an
examination of the narr. in each case did not show that the two
actions were for the same cause. "On the contrary" remarked
Paxson J. "they refer to different portions of the property."
The trial court, without error, refused to tell the jury that since
there was no evidence of any mining since the commencement of
the first action, there could be no recovery in the second. Whether
this was on the theory that not the mining but the subsidence was
the cause of the action, and because the point of the defendant did
not suggest that there had been no subsidences since the commencement of the first action, does not appear, nor whether the court
held that the surface owner is not obliged to embrace in one
6Williams v. Hay, 120
6120

Pa. 485.

Pa. 485.
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action, all subsidences in any part of his land, that have thef
occurred but may ideally divide his land as he chooses and treat
subsidences on each part as a separate cause of action. In Pantall v. Coal & Iron Co, '"- A owned a surface tract of 60 acres.
In 1894 he sued the owner of the coal below, for the falling in of
the surface over 29 acres of this tract. In 1898, he served notice
on the defendant that he would claim damages for subsidences
occurring down to the trial, and at the trial he proved subsidences
that had occurred since the commencement of the action, and
May 19 1898, obtained a verdict for damages. In 1899 he brought
a second action for damages to the other portion of the tract,
embracing 31 acres. Although there was no evidence of subsidences thereof, since May 19th 1898, and although no mining
had taken place since the commencement of the former action in
1894, the court allowed a recovery; that is, it assumed that the
action did not need to embrace all damages arising prior to the
verdict, from such removals of supports everywhere in the tract
of 60 acres, as had preceded the commencement of the action.
Beaver J. intimates that, had it appeared that there were any
subsidences in the 31 acres, before the first action, it would have
been necessary to sue, in that action, for the entire damage to the
whole tract, arising from the niining which had preceded the
action. As this did not appear, there was no error in permitting
a recovery in the second action. In the Supreme court, Mitchell
J. holds that the trial of the second action was erroneous in so
far as it went on the hypothesis that the cause of action was the.
subsidence, and not the prior removal of the supports. The correct
hypothesis being adopted, there would have properly been no
recovery in the second action, because -11 the excavations made
by the defendant had already occurred when the first action was
brought, in which, therefore should have been sought the damages for injury to the whole tract. The defendant had however
united with the plaintiff in asking the trial court to consider the
subsidences, and not the prior exfodiations, the cause of action,
and, on that hypothesis, it was necessary to combine in the first
action, claims for the damages arising from such subsidences
only as had occurred before the action was brought while for
subsidences occurring later, though before the termination of the
first action, a second action wks appropriate. When in the first
action notice of the intention to claim damages for subsidences
572o4

Pa. 158 affirming 18 Super, 341.
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arising down tO the trial, was given, what was meant was damages to the land which was described in the narr. viz the 29 acres.'
STATUTE OF LIMITATION.

It was held by Rice, P. J., in Hill v. Pardee59 that although
the last excavation had occurred before 1858, if the falling in
occurred in 1883, an action begun in 1885 was not barred by the
statute of limitation. The judgment was reversed for a misjoinder
of defendants, but the supreme court said that the application of the
statute of liniitation could be better determined, when the plaintiff
had elected against which of the defendants to proceed. In Noonan
v. Pardee' the court at length held (a) that the cause of action
is the withdrawal of support, and not the later subsidence, and
that the six years must run from the former, and not the latter
event. In order that the surface owner may know whether the
props have been improperly removed, he has a right to visit and
examine the mine. (b) Nevertheless, the cause of action is not
an adequate cause of action, for no suit begun befQre an actual
subsidence will be entertained, although when one subsidence
has occurred and an action is then brought, damages may be
recovered in that action, (nay, probably must be claimed in that
action) for any subsidences occurring between the inception of
the suit and the trial. (c) Because the cause of action, viz the ablation of the supports, although adequate to set the statute of
limitation in operation, is not adequate to sustain an action until
reinforced by some subsidence, the unenforceable, the ghostly
right of action passes with the ownership of the sfrface, until a
subsidence occurs, and he who is then the owner, may, and no
other, no predecessor, and no successor, can bring the action,
positions which are worthy of the astonished admiration of the
world and have secured it.
FOR WHAT DAMAGES MAY BE SECURED.

The withdrawal of the supports from the surface makes a
cave-in more or less probable, according to circumstances. If
58

1n Thompson v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., i Luz. L. Obs. 25, Conyngham, J., held that when, after a suit is begun, the defendant ceases to mine,
there can be no second action for a subsidence that occurs later and which
carries down a house erected since the first action. The subterranean work
already done having made it unsafe to erect a house on the surface, the
plaintiff could in the first action, have recovered for the thus diminished
value of the lot.
59143 Pa. 98.
02oo Pa' 474.

THE FORUM
this withdrawal is known to the owner of the surface, he will be
impeded in his use of the soil. He will not feel free to build
upon it. If others know of the abstraction of the support, they
will appraise the surface less, and be willing, if buying it at all,
to pay only a less price. The owner then suffers loss from the
mere withdrawal'of the support, in advance of any subsidence.
There is no authority however, for a recovery of damages. On
the contrary, Noonan v. Pardee6' says that no damage is suffered
until a subsidence, and then the present, owner suffers it; no predecessor. "He alone has the right to sue." But, when one subsidence, however limited in area, however trivial has occurred, it
has been held"2 that damages can be recovered for the effect of the
probability of future subsidences; e. g. for the inability to erect
houses on the land on account of the risk of collapse of the surface. Still clearer is it that for subsidences that actually occur
between the commencement of the suit and the trial, there may
be a recovery in that action.
INJURY TO LAND.

Subsidences may injure the soil, break up'the surface, render
-it unsusceptible of cultivation," or of occupation by houses," or
other improvements. A private way may be injured' as also
fences, trees, vines.'
For these species of injury, damages may
be recovered.
INJURY TO SPRINGS.

An injury for which damages are frequently sought, is that
to springs. These may be destroyed even by the proper operation of mining, and not as a result of the breaking and subsidence
of the surface. For such a destruction there can be no damages. 6'
But, when the spring would not have been dried up, if the surface
had not been deprived of the support which the owner of the
6120o

Pa. 474.

6

'Thompson v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., i Luz. L. Obs. 25.
6'Gumbert v. Kilgore, 4 Sadler, 84, Williams v. Hay i2o Pa. 485;

Pringle v. Vesta Coal Co., 172 Pa. 438; Jones v. Wagner, 66 Pa. 429.
64Rabe v. Shoenberger Coal Co., 213 Pa. 252.
65Id.
66jones v. Wagner, 66 Pa. 429.
61
Gumbert v. Kilgore, 4 Sadler 84; Weaver v. Berwind-White Coal Co.,
2x6 Pa. 295; McGowan v. Bailey, 146 Pa. 572; Robertson v. Coal Co., -172
Pa. 566; Barnes verw ind, 3 Penny 144, Coleman v. Chadwick, 8o Pa. 8i.
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subterranean soil owes, its destruction or impairment will be a
proper subject for compensation.'
In Barnes v. Berwind" the
defendant attempted to show that the drying up of the spring
was not the result of subsidence of the surface, by proof that
springs on the same hill had dried up, although the land in which
they were had not been broken or disturbed. For some reason
it was not err.or to exclude this evidence; possibly because it was
not "material."
The quantity of the injury from the drying up
of a spring will depend onl the existence of other springs on the
premises, yielding a sufficiently copious supply. If there'are other
springs from which water can be conducted to the point where
the dry spring is by means of pipes, the cost of piping only,
would be the damage.-"
INJURY TO BUILDING.

The trial judge told that the jury, in Gumbert v. Kilgore"
without error that it is "the duty of the mine owners to support
the surface as it was in its ancient condition, as it was before
there was any house there. That is their duty, and it is no more
than that. It is not their duty, if a person gets possession of the
surface after they have bought their right and chooses to build
an enormous building there; nor would it be reasonable or law
that they should, at immense expense, build great walls or things
of that kind to sustain the surface; but they are bound to support it in its natural condition, and, if supported in its natural
condition, the house would not have got out of plumb, would not
have been injured, then they are liable for damages. They are
bound to sustain it in its natural condition, and if an ordinary
house was put upon it by the owner of the surface, and by reason
of their not supporting the surfa'ce to (in?) that condition, injury occurred, they are liable for damages."
He attempted to
make the language clearer, and practically said that, if without
the weight of the house in addition to that of the soil, the subsidence would not have occurred, there could be no recovery; if the
subsidence of the surface would have occurred, even had the house
8Gumbert v. Kilgore, 4 Sadler 847 Barnes v. Berwind, 3 Penny 14o;
Pringle v. Vesta Coal Co., 172 Pa. 438; Emerson v. Schoonmaker, 135 Pa.
437; Weaver v. Berwind-White Coal Co., zi6 Pa. 195; Kistler v. Thompson,
i58 Pa. 139.
93

Penny. 140.

70

Rabe v. Shoenberger Coal Co. 213 Pa. z52.

714

Sadler 84.
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not been there, there could be a recovery, not only for the damage to
the soil, but for that to the house. In Jones v. Wagner. Thompson' C. J., remarked, "As to the house in question damaged, it
undoubtedly had a right to supports as incident to the ground on
which it stood. What might be the consequence of building in
an unreasonable manner, taking into view the mining rights beneath, on a question of the sufficiency of the supports, does not
These are probably
arise in this case, and need not be decided."
the only cases in which it is intimated that the character of the
buiilding may determine whether the miner will be liable for the
injury to the soil, or to the building, from a cave-in. There is a
manifest inconvenience in setting the jury to speculate as to
whether the soil would have caved in, but for the added weight
of the building, the evidence being often such as to make a decided opinion on that point impossible to a prudent inquirer.
Still more objectionable would be the application of a test, based
on the character of the building. In a city like Scranton are
great and fine churches, built at the risk of the congregationsis the court house, are the office buildings, the public
Is the
schools built at the risk of the surface owners?
court or the jury to say how expensive, large and heavy
a structure may be erected without surrendering the right to compensation should surface-support be taken away? The buildings
that have ordinarily come into consideration are dwelling houses,
and farm buildings and fences. " In one case a church in Hyde
Park was injured to the extent of $9,740. 4 It may be stated
therefore, that unless a building is unreasonable in size and
weight and expensiveness, there can be a recovery for damages
to it, as well as to the soil, when it does not appear that there
would have been no subsidence of the soil, had the building not
been on it. Probably there may be a recovery, even if there
would have been no cave-in, had the weight of the building not
been added to that of the soil.
,166 Pa. 429.

Dafnages for injury to the house were recovered.

'Coal & Iron Co. v. Taylor, i Foster 361; Nelson v. Hoch, i4 Phila.
655; Carlin v. Chappel iot Pa. 348; Pringle v. Vesta Coal Co., 172 Pa. 438;
Noonan v. Pardee, 200 Pa. 474; Rabe v. Shoenberger Coal Co., 213 Pa. 252;
Weaverv. Berwind-White Coal Co. 216 Pa. 195.
"Scranton v. Phillips, 94 Pa. 15. A judgment for the church was reversed simpl, because the predecessor of the church had released the mine
owner of all liability for loss of surface support.
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THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES.

Some injuries may be so small as not to affect the market
value. The formation of a pit a foot deep, and a yard in diameter, in the field of a farm of 100 acres, would not subtract a
dollar from its selling price. It would be hazardous to affirm
that there an be no recovery of damages unless the market value
of the land has been diminished; though propositions involving
that principle have been laid down. Injuries have been in some
cases classified as irremediable and therefore permanent, and remediable. When an injury of the former sort has been inflicted,
the measure of damages is the diminution of the market value of
the premises: when of the latter, the measure will be the cost of
th6 reparation, provided that in no case will more be recoverable
than represents the diminution of market value. "If the injury
is reparable" says Elkin, J. 7" "the cost of repairing may be recovered, and if the cost of repairing is greater than the diminution in the market value, the latter is the true measure of dam*
When the injury is permanent (i. e. not
ages."6
*
*
reparable) the measure of damages is the difference in market
value before and after the injury." -In Rabe v. Shoenberger
Coal Co.-' an absurd variation of the latter branch of this rule
appears. "The sound, clear (!) rule" says Potter, J., "is stated
[in four cited cases] that when the injury is permanent, the
measure of damages is the difference in market value, before and
after the injury or the cost ofremoving the obstruction, whichever is the lower amount," but how that injury is "permanent"
which can be removed at any cost; particularly at a cost less
than the diminution of the market value, only men in elevated
positions of observation may be expected to perceive. The difference of market value is in no case admitted by Dean, J., to
be the correct measure of damages although in the case before
him he admits that "perhaps it worked no injustice." The true
measure, he says is the actualloss from the cave-in, 8 which is no
measure at all. How are we to find out what the loss is?
75Weaver v. Berwind-White Coal Co., 216 Pa. 195.
76
1t follows that as a.sinking of surfac e does not affect the market value
the owner must allow it to remain, or, if he fills up, must do so without
compensation.
77213 Pa. 252. Depreciation in value of the land was the measure in

Barnes v. Berwind, 3 Penny. 140.
78Noonan v. Pardee, 200 Pa. 474.
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WHEN IS THE INJURY PERMANEMT.

But few tests are suggested for deciding when an injury is
permanent. The destruction of five springs was declared to be
such, as also the destruction of the availableness of the surface
for building purposes, while cracks across a right of way, which
could be filled were held remediable, and the cost of the restoration of the way was said to be the measure."' Apparently in
Thompson v. Traction Co.,' one of the cases cited in Rabe v.
Shoenberger Coal Co., a traction railway having been laid at a
height of one foot above the former level of the road, in' front
of the plaintiff's premises, the injury was regarded by the trial
judge as reparable, because the level of the ground might be
raised, but as this process would cost more than the difference in
the market value of the premises the latter was adopted as the
measure."' Probably the injury is to be esteemed permanent,
when in the present state of the practical arts, the restoration
would be impossible, or when though possible, it could be done
only with an expense exceeding the reduction, wrought by the
injury, of the market value. The rule would then be that in all
cases, the diminution of the market value of the premises is the
measure of damages, for that diminution could never be greater
than the expense of restoration, andif itwas less, the expense of
restoration would not be an admissible measure.
ELEMUENTS OF DAMAGE.

The diminution of the market value of the land must be occasioned by modifications of the land itself; by subversion of the
soil, destruction of springs, damages to houses; fences, trees,
vines. A part of this total diminution will be caused by one of
these facts, another part by another. An accurate judge of
values, would decide that the effect of the damage to the house,
was a reduction by $500, from the value of the premises; the
change of contour of the ground, a reduction 9f another $500,
79

Rabe v. Shoenberger Coal Co. 213 Pa. 252.
80181 Pa. 131.
8

*InSeely v- Alden, 61 Pa. 302, an action for allowing tan bark f'om a
tannery to fill up plaintiffs mill-pond, the rule was laid down that if the cost
of cleaning out the pond would be less than the diminution of the value
of the land, that cost, otherwise, that diminution, would be the measure of
damages, as if there could be a difference. If, the pond free from the tan
bark, the farm would be worth $5,ooo, and obstructed with the bark, the
farm would be worth $4,500, it would be because either the tan bark was not
removable, or the cost of its removal would be $5oo.
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etc. The sum of these reductions might be the total 'reduction.
But buyers of land are not generally so arithmetically precise.
They consider all the modifications simultaneously, and decide
that they would, all co-operating, reduce the value of its premises
by so such. Witnesses are allowed to state that they regard the
loss of springs, the shattering or torsion of the house, the reduction of the capacity of the soil to be cultivated, and to state
that in their opinion the combined effect of these phenomena, is
a diminution by so much in the value of the land. They are not
allowed to say in chief that they appraise the loss from phenomenon a at so much; from phenomenon b at so much; from plienomenon c at so much; and therefore from tfie combination of
all, the entire loss at the sum of the particular estimates. 12 It is only
the cross examiner who may elicit this sort of information from the
witness. There is a possibility that the loss from one phenomenon,
were it alone would be greater than when it co-exists with
another, in which case addition of the various estimates would
be misleading. The loss to the farm for the uses to which it has
been put might be greater than the loss to it for all the uses to
which it may be put. Hence the former is irrelevant. The loss
of the capacity of the land to be used as a dairy farm, may be regarded only as it affects the value of the land for any and all
When a man owning a lot bounded on a street,
proposes.'
owns to the centre, he is entitled to damages for depressions beWhen
yond his lot fence and within the street but on his side.'
there are two mines, one below the other and mining in the lower

causes the upper and the surface to fall in, the owner of the sur8
face may recover damages from the owner of the lower mine. 1
OPINION EVIDENCE.

Witnesses may express their opinion as to the effect of the
various results; e. g. of the loss of support, destruction of fences,
vines, trees, buildings, subversion of soil, drying up of springs,
upon the market value.'
8
The effect of the loss of the springs on the farm value cannot be consideredotherwjse than asit inconjunction with all otherinjurious phenomena
affects market value. Rabe v. Shoenberger Coal Co., 213 Pa. 252; Weaver
v. Berwind-White Coal Co., 216 Pa. 195.
83
Weaver v. Berwind White Coal Co., 216 Pa. 195.
8
Barnes v. Berwind, 3 Penny. 140.
85Noonan v. Pardee, 200 Pa. 474.
8
6Weaverv. Berwind-White Coal Co., 216 Pa. i95; Rabe v.Shoenberger
Coal Co., 213 Pa. 252.
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VERDICTS.

Verdicts of various amounts ranging from $200 to $9,740,
have been recovered, a few of which are mentioned in the note.'
INTEREST.

Lapse of time between the doing of the injury and the trial
may be considered by the jury, in arriving at a verdict, but "it is
well settled that interest eo nomine, is not recoverable in actions
ex delicto, as it is in cases where a definite sum of money is demandable as a debt."
Hence, the court having instructed the
jury to find the amount of damage and to allow interest on that
amount, the supreme court assuming that the jury had obeyed
the instructions of the court, and finding that the verdict of $612
embraced $162.24 of interest, deducted the latter amount from
the judgment, and correcting it to $449.76, affirmed it.'
'Carlin v. Chappel, 1o Pa. 348 ($2oo); Barner v. Berwind, 3 Penny 140
($301.30); Williams v. Hay, 120 Pa. 485 ($250); Gumbert v. Kilgore, 4 Sadler
84 ($400); Chadwick v. Coleman, 8o Pa. 91 ($700); Jones v. Wagner, 66
Pa. 429 ($iooo); Robertson v. Coal Co., 172 Pa. 566 ($185o); Scranton v"
Phillips, 94 Pa. 15 ($9740).

'Emerson v. Shoonmaker, 135 Pa. 437. The jury had allowed interets
from the time of the cave-in to the trial, in Barnes v. Berwind, 3 Penny.
140; Coleman v. Chadwick, 8o Pa. 8i. In Heath v. Walton, 9 Dist. 218, the
court appointed a surveyor at the plaintiff's instance to examine the work
ings of the mine and to furnish a plot. The costs however, could not be
taxed against the defendant.
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MOOT COURT.
DUCKETT V. BOROUGH OF FRANKLIN.
rlarried women-injury to wife-loss of services-right of husband
to ,secure damages.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Sarah Duckett was driving along a street when the vehicle ran into a
deep hole near the middle of the street, and was overturned. She was
severely hurt and disabled. Her husband with her sues the borough
claiming damages for the loss of her services. She divided her time between a business that he was conducting and one which she carried on on
her own account. But for the assistance given him by her he would have
been obliged to employ a hand at $5oo per year. In her own business on
an investment of $i5oo, she was earning profit amounting to $4oo a year.
Her husband claims compensation for both these items for a period of 20
years, the probable length of the wife's earning power.
Duffy for plaintiff.
Husband is entitled to recover under Act of May 8, 1895, P. L. 54.
Husband is entitled to show as an element of his damage the value of his
wife's services in assistance which she gave to his business. Standen v.
Penna. R.R. Co., 214 Pa. 189.
Boyer for the defendant.
No evidence of any contract for wages between husband and wife.
Proceeds of separate business are sectired against husband or his creditors.
Frost v. Knatt, io Sup. 296. Husband not entitled to damages, for injury
in reference to her sole and separate property. Standen v. Pa. R.R. Co.,
189. Expectancy, as given by mortality tables is not conclusive. Steinbrunner v. R. R. Co, 146 Pa. 504.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
LA BAR, J.-The primary question whether there can be a recovery
in any amount depends upon the facts whether the defendant Borough was
negligent in the care of its street, and that the plaintiff was using ordinary
care -at the time of the injury. These facts are to be determined by the
jury from all the circumstances in the case. If these facts are found in
favor of the plaintiff, then the principal contention seems to be as to the
measure of damages to bc allowed the husband. The Act of May 8, 1895,
provides that the damages sustained by the husband and wife in cases like
the present shall be ascertained and redressed in only one suit brought in
the name of the husband and wife and that separate verdicts shall be rendered, one determining the right of the wife, and the other verdict determining the right of the husband, and that separate judgments shall be
entered thereon with the right to separate executions. The manifest advantages of this procedure are, that it saves expense and prevents the possibility of double recovery of damages. Hensel vs. Traction Co., 14 Pa.

Superior 420.
Uuder said Act what damages are the jury to allow the husband in
making up their verdicts?
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The statutes of Pennsylvania vest in a married woman all earnings
acquired by her in carrying on any separate or independent business or in
performing any labor or service on her sole and separate account, but these
statutes do not change the rule as to the earnings of the wife acquired in
her capacity as wife for services rendered about her household duties or
when assisting her husband in his business. Readdy vs. Shamokin Boro.,
137 Pa. 98; Nuding vs. Urich, 169 Pa. 289; Platz vs. McKean Twsp., 187 Pa.,
6oi. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary such earnings beloni
to her husband and any deprivation of these earnings or any diminution
or loss of her capacity to assist her husband in his business caused by the
negligent act of the defendant is an injury to the husband for which he is
entitled to recover. Therefore the husband would be entitled to damages
for the loss of profits, viz: $5o6 per year, on account of his being obliged to
employ another hand, for such length of time as the jury find to be the
probable length of the wife's earning power. Standen vs. Penna. R.R. Co.,
214 Pa. 198.
As to the second item of damages, viz: $400 per year; the loss of profits
in'her own separate business, the husband is not entitled to have them assessed in his verdict. Such earnings, under our statutes are given to the wife ab
solutely and neither the husband nor his creditors have any right to them.
And the jury is directed to include in the verdict for the wife the loss occasioned to her separate business by reason of said injury caused by the
hegligent act of the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The earnings of a married woman are her property, under the legislation of 1887 and 1893. But to say that, is to say that the power to render
the services for which compensation is given, is the wife's and that she can
exercise it or not as she will, for whom she will, and for what wages she
will. She may choose to exert the power for her husbahd, but only under
a contract for wages. She will then be entitled, to recover the wages from
him despite the rival claims of other creditors. Nuding v. Urich, 169 Pa.,
289. She may also exert her power to work for her husband without ex
pectation of compensation. But, though she has for a week, month, or
year thus worked for her husband gratuitously, she may at any time, change
her purpose. She may hire her services to another; or she may devote her
time and labor exclusively to a business of her own. If she does the last,
the fruit of that labor will be hers. Nay, even if the husband works for her,
without contract for compensation, the fruit of his labor will be hers. Martin v. Davis, 30 Super. 59.
In the case before us, as the wife conducted one business and the husband
another, she divided her time between them. She may have given onehalf of it to her own and one-half to her husband's. How long she had
been doing this, does not appear. Was it a week, a month, a year? It is
clear that if she thus equally divided the time, she might, at any moment,
make a different division of it. Her own business might become more important than her husband's. She might give two-thirds, three-fourths, fourfifths of her time to her own, and only the remainder to his.
The husband has no legal power to coerce his wife to work for him,
and therefore, he has no legal right to her work. If she gives it, it is be-
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cause she wills to give it, and her will may change, for good or bad reasons,
at any time. How then can it be said with any confidence, that, by the
loss of the wife's power to work, the husband has lost one-half of the earning value of that power? It might though unreduced by the accident have
been withdrawn from him by her at any time. To assume that, because
she has for a few weeks been giving, him one-half of her earning power,
she will for 20 years continue to gixe it to him, is to indulge in an almost
baseless speculation.
It must be conceded nevertheless, that the making of this assumption
has been indulged. The defeat of the husband's mere expectancy of the
services of his wife, has been made a ground of'compensation. Cf. Henry
v. Klopfer, i47 Pa. 178; Platz v. McKean Township, 178 Pa., 6oi; Kelley v.
Mayberry Township, 154 Pa. 440.
It does not appear why Duckett claimed compensation for the reduced earning power for 20 years. Was that the probable length of the
future life of his wife? But if so, what was the probable length of his own
life? If he should die before her, he would no longer be entitled to the
products of her working power. What evidence was there, that the coverture would be likely to last for 2o years, although her earning power should
continue so long? If he was io or 15 years older than she, and her earning
power would, but for the accident, have lasted only 20 years, it is not at all
probable that the husband would have been alive during the whole period
of 2o years, to enjoy its results. It is not necessary to advert to the possibility of the dissolution of the marriage by a divorce.
The learned court below has cited cases which say that, despite recent
legislation, the earnings of a wife continue to belong to the husband, when
she labors in the house at the ordinary domestic work of a wife, or she
assists him in his business. "It is only," says Mestrezat J., "when she engages at labor or in business in her own right and not as wife, that the
statute declares that the accumulations of earnings from that labor or business shall be her property and belong to her and not to her husband or
his creditors" Standen v. Penna. R.R. Co. 214 Pa. 189, but this seems to
mean merely that, if she assists her husband in his business, or labors in
the home, without contract for compensation, she will be understood as
giving her labor to him, and the products of it will be his and not hers,
available for his creditors, as against her or her creditors.
It does not
mean that he has any legal power to compel her to labor for him, whether
at his business or in his house. When, in the same case, the writer of the
opinion further says "As the earnings of the wife for services performed in
the business of her husband belong to the latter, any deprivation of these
earnings or any diminution or loss of her capacity to assist in his business
caused by the negligent act of the appellant company was an injury to the
husband for which he was entitled to recover in this action," he virtually
says that the husband may recover for the loss of so much of the wife's
earning power, as she would probably have exerted, gratuitously for him.
If it had appeared that Mrs. Duckett had been giving the $400 made
by her in her own business, the plaintiff would have had as solid reasons
for recovering for the loss of the earning power that produced it, as for
that which, applied directly to 'his business, saved him the expenditure of
$500 per year. How could it matter whether the wife gratuitously applied
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her labor to the business of her husband, or gratuitously surrendered to
him the annual fruits of her labor applied to her own?
The court laid down the principle that Duckett should recover so many
times $5oo as there were years through which his wife's earning power
would have continued. This is scarcely precise enough. The earning
power might last 2o years, yet suffer reduction long before that. In lo
years it might not be more than 5o per cent of its present strength. The
attention of the jury ought also to have been directed to the legal voluntariness of the wife's continued employment of her earning.power for the benefit
of the husband. If it were certain that she would use it always for him,
surely a greater compensation should be allowed, than if this continued
use of it was only probable. The jury working in so speculative a field, should
consider the difference between the degrees of likelihood that the plaintiff,
but for the accident would have realized a contemplated benefit. The present worth of the probability of saving for a series of years, $500, is not
equal to the present worth of $5oo for that series.
Judgment reversed with v.,f. d. n.

DEEMER v. McCRACKEN.
Mortgage by agent.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Deemer had employed William Smithers, a nephew of McCracken, as
agent, and Smithers had embezzled $3500. Deemer threatened to prosecute Smithers who terrified executed a mortgage on McCracken's land and
induced him to sign it-on the pretext that he, Smithers, was borrowing for
him, McCracken, from Deemer, $35oo. The intention in fact was to deliver
it to Deemer as security for Smithers' note to Deemer for the money that
had been embezzled. Receiving it Deemer did not prosecute. This is a
"scifa"upon the mortgage.
Smith for plaintiff.
Davis for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
COOKE, J.-We cannot agree with the defendant that the mortgage
was void because it was given to "stifle the prosecution of a crime."
By the act of Mar. 31, i86o, P. & L. 1187, Sec. 232, embezzlement is
made a misdemeanor, but the legislature further provides, Brightley's Purd.
Dig., 377, that, where the offense is not charged to have been done with
intent to commit a felony or not being an infamous crime, and for which
there shall be a remedy by action, the case may be settled and the defendant discharged. Williams v. Dreshler, 14 W. N. C., 211.
In Schuylkill Co. v. Copley, 67 Pa. 386, it was held that embezzlement
wag not an infamous crime, though the punishment is the same as that inflicted for infamous crimes in Pennsylvania.
The cases of Riddle v. Hall, 99 Pa., 116 and Pierce v. Wilson, iii Pa.,
14, decided that-embezzling money from a bank and falsifying records "are
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offences of a very high grade, much more detrimental to the common weal
than many of the lower grades of felony," and such cannot be settled "as
officers of an incorporated banj, chartered in part, at least, for the public
benefit, the parties accused occupied a quasi-public position." Ash v.
Williams, 26 Pa. C. C. 28, is to same effect.
The offense of fraud in misappropriating money, as a broker, is but a
misdemeanor under the Criminal proceedure Act; and can be-settled and an
action had for the amount misappropriated. Williams v. Dreshler, supra.
The same was held in Rothermel v. Hughes, 134 Pa. 510, and Grier v.
Shade, i6 W. N. C. 222, (obtaining money by means of false and fraudulent
representations) where. the judge said, "it is well settled, that an agreement
in consideration of stifling or compounding a criminal prosecution or proceeding for a felony or misdemeanor of a public nature, is void. There
are, however, misdemeanors of an inferior class, in which the public is presumed to have less interest. They are assumed to effect chiefly the parties
aggrieved thereby. The settlement of offenses of this class is not illegal
and therefore, an agreement between the offender and the party aggrieved
is not invalid."
Nevertheless McCracken can avoid the mortgage on the ground of
fraud, unless the jury find that he delayed repudiating the acts of Smithers
long enough to make these acts his own.
In Stoddart v. Robinson, 54 Pa. 386, which was a scire facias on a
mortgage, where the defendant pleaded that she was not indebted to the
mortgagee and that she gave the mortgage on representations and solicitations of her father, these representations not being true. The mortgage
being given in mistake, the court ruled that this was not sufficient defense.
However, in Cridge v. Hare, 98 Pa., 56i, where the wife executed a
mortgage on her property, supposing that it was as security for a bill of
goods purchased by her husband, but which was in fact security for another
the Court charged that if she was induced to give the mortgage on representation that it was for purchase money of property sold to her husband,
she may avoid it for deceit; the mortgagor may defend on ground that it
was procured by fraud, or that a fraudtulent use was made of it, even though
such representations were bot nade by the mortgagee nor with his knowledge or consent. Commentingon Stoddart v. Robinson, supra, the judge
held that it was decided upon the special circumstances, in that the loose
affidavit was insufficient. Heister v. Glasgow, 79 Pa. 83; Green v. No. Buffalo
Township, 56 Pa. ixo; and Schuylkill Co. v. Copely, 67 Pa. 386 are cases to
the same effect.
McCracken made Smithers his special agent, to borrow $35oo from
Deemer, for McCracken, and gave him the mortgage for that purpose and
for no other purpose. According to P. & L. Dig. of Dec., Vol. 11, pg. 520,
if the special agent exceed the special and limited authority conferred on
him, the principal is not bound by his acts; and in McCleary's appeal, 20
W. N. C., 547, it was held that the fact that a party by putting title papers
in the hands of a conveyance, to make a.loan, has rendered it possible for
the conveyancer to perpetrate a fraud, by issuing a false mortgage, does
not of itself render the principal responsible for such fraud.
But a principal who neglects promptly to disavow the acts of his agent,
who has transcended his authority, makes the act his own; he is bound to
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disavow it the first moment the fact comes to his knowledge;

Breden v.

Dubarry, 14 W. & S. 26.

We charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that Deemer cannot recover on
this mortgage unless you find that he held the mortgage long enough for
McCracken to have had notice that he (Deemer) did not understand that
he was holding only as security for money which he was to loan to
McCracken. In other words, if McCracken was negligent in not ascertaining from his nephew, Smithers, what had become of the money, which he
was to have received from Deemer, or if he knew that Deemer had not
paid the money to Smithers, and was careless in not ascertaining the reason
therefor, he is bound by the acts of his agent and the mortgagee can recover.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Smithers had embezzled $3500 of the money of Deemer his principal.
His act was indictable. We are convinced by the considerations presented
by the learned court below, that this embezzlement could be settled. It
was not an infamous crime. The money embezzled could be civilly sued
for. The crime injured Deemer. It was not done with the intent to commit a felony. It is no more serious an offence, than obtaining money by
false pretences, which can be settled; Geier v. Shade, 16 W. N. C. 222.
The party whose funds were embezzled, was an individual, not a savings
bank, Pearce v. Wilson, iii Pa. 14; Riddle v. Hall, 99 Pa. 116; or a building association, Ash v. Jackson, 26 Pa. C. C. 28; or other institution in
whose solvency many are directly interested.
But were this embezzlement a crime so serious as to be incapable of
settlement, it would not follow that the mortgage on which the suit is
brought would be void. McCracken knew nothing of the crime. He executed the mortgage to Deemer, not in order that Deemer should hold it as
security for the payment of the embezzled money, but that he should loan
$3500 to himself. The mortgage was in fact delivered to Deemer for the
former purpose but despite McCracken's intention.
Deemer did not in fact prosecute Smithers, and a jury doubtless could
have inferred from the evidence, that he agreed, when receiving the mortgage, not to prosecute. But, they have not so inferred. A mortgage given
for Smithers', debt to Deemer was not unenforceable, unless it was given
under a contract that Deemer should not prosecute. Moyer v. Dodson,
212 Pa. 344.

A deception was practiced by Smithers upon McCracken in regard to
the purpose to which the money to be procured by the former, from Deemer
should be applied. Smithers intended it to pay a debt due by him, as a result of his embezzlement, to Deemer. McCracken intended it to come to
himself in the form of a loan. But, Smithers was McCracken's agent, not
Deemer's. Deemer knew of no fraud. Why then should he be deprived
of the right to enforce the mortgage? If McCracken had not known that
the mortgage was such; had he, being illiterate, been misinformed as to its
import, he would not be liable. Green v. North Buffalo Township, 56 Pa.
iio; Schuylkill County v. Copley, 67 Pa. 386. It does not appear that he
was illiterate, nor that the import of the mortgage was mistated to him.
Cridge v. Hare, 98 Pa. 561, assests the doctrine that a married woman may
avoid a mortgage given under the influence of false representations in
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which the mortgagee in no way participates, but McCracken is not a married woman.
No consideration was given by Deemer to McCracken for the mortgage. It does not appear that he sacrificed any right against Smithers,
not even the right to civilly sue, or criminally prosecute him. But, this
absence of consideration, the mortgage being under seal, and a quasiconveyance of an interest in land,, does not preclude "its enforcement, despite
the fraud by which its execution was induced. Moyer v. Dodson, 212 Pa. 344.
The instruction to the jury concerning estoppel we do not think relevant.
McCracken was bound from the moment that his mortgage was accepted
by Deemer, and not from that later time at which he might be charged
with negligence in not having discovered the fraud practiced upon him.
Judgment affirmed.

IN RE SEWALL'S ESTATE.
Validity of bequest to bastard.
Forsyth, for legatee.
Skinner, against the legacy.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
CLARK, J.-The testator in his will, made a provision bequeathing to
an unborn, illegitimate expressly admitted the sum of $zooo to be used for
the maintenance and support of said child, born of a certain mother.
While there are no decisions in Pennsylvania deciding this question, it
has been held in this country, that an unborn illegitimate child may be a
devisee or legatee if sufficiently designated. Am. and Eng. Encl. of Law,
Vol. 18-736. On th2 principle of the early authorities a gift to an unborn
illegitimate child was void, as a gift to an unborn bastard. It is now clear,
however, that a gift to a natural child, of which a particular woman is
e.nceinte, is good. If an illegitimate child en ventre sa mzere is sufficiently
described so as to ascertain the object intended to be pointed out it may
take.
The early authorities held that where the gift is to a child of which a
particular woman is enceinte generally the fact of the birth is the sole
ground of title, and that is easy of ascertainment. On the other hand, a
gift t,, a child- of which a particular woman is enceinte by a particular man
introduces into the description of the object a circumstance which the law
treats as uncertain (a bastard being in respect to his paternal parent at
leastflius nullius).
The objection to the ;vill is on ground of uncertainty. If the objection to gifts of this description was referable simply to this ground, there
would be no difficulty in saying that such a devise might be sustained as it
is evident that a gift to a future illegitimate child, does not involve greater
uncertainty than such a devise to a legitimate child.
It is also attackedon grounds of public policy. Itisargued that to support the great interests of morality is part of the policy of every well regulated state, and has long been -aprinciple of our law. If the'child was not
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already conceived in the mother's womb we would hold that it would be a
direct incentive to vice, but as the testator has admitted the child to be his,
he has recognized his obligation to support it. We therefore hold that the
unoffending offspring can recover through his guardian.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The child intended and described by the testator, as his legatee was
en ventre sa mere, when the will was written. Such a child is as capable
of being a legtee or devisee, as one that has been born, when the will is
written, McKnight v. Read, i Whart. 213; Swift v. Duffield, 5 S. & R, 38;
iS Am. and Eng. Encyc. 735.
Were the paternity of the testator disputable or even negatived, the bequest would not be impaired. A testator may give his property to those
who are not related to him at all.
The testator admitted that he was illegitimately the father of the
legatee. Does this circumstance avoid the bequest? The principle is
almost universal that a man can by will, give his property to whom he
chooses. He cannot deprive a widow Qf certain interests, without her
assent, and certain gifts would be contrary to a so-called "public policy,"
"Every person may be a legatee or devisee in the absence of some special
disability" j8 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, 735. "Illegitimate children
may be devisees or legatees under a will, if sufficiently described" i8 Am.
and Eng. Encyc. 736; 3 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 893.
It is the policy of the state to compel the father of a bastard to support it, at least for a series of years. In making a bequest for its support,
he is but carrying out that policy. We understand no reason for holding
that such a bequest is void.
Appeal dismissed.
WOOD v. BALLANTINE.
Sal.es-installment contracts-effect of breach-rescission-right to
resale-damages.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Wood contracted to sell 5o bales of cotton to Ballantine. It was provided that the cotton should be delivered at the rate of 5 bales per month,
on the first day of each month, delivery to begin January i, 19o4, price payable in installments, cash on delivery. Ballantine paid promptly on delivery
of first 5 bales, but when February installment was tendered, he stated that
he was then unable to pay cash. Wood withheld the cotton and two days
later gave Ballantine notice that he intended to sell the remaining 45 bales
at auction within xo days at a designated place. After sufficient advertisement the auction was held and Wood bought in the cotton at highest bidder.
Wood now sues Ballantine for the difference between contract price'and
price secured at the resale, with expenses of sale, etc.
Wallis for plaintiff.
Contract is entire, and not severable. Graver v. Scott, 8o Pa.88; Martin
v. Fridenburg, 169 Pa. 447. Refusal to pay on delivery entitled vendor to
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action. Hartje v. Collins, 46 Pa. 268. Proper to resell goods and recover
difference between contract and selling price. Coffman v. Hampton, 2 W.
& S. 377; Andrews v. Hoover, 8 Watts 39.
No brief was filed for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
REED, J:-When the contract for sale of goods provides that delivery
shall be by installments payable on delivery, and the buyer fails to take an
installment and pay for same when due, or where the seller makes defective
delivery, the question arises whether the breach gives a right merely to a
claim for damages, or a right to consider the whole contract as rescinded.
The early English decisions are in conflict. Hoare v. Rennie, 5 Hurl.
& N. 19, holds that the failure of the vendor to make proper delivery of an
installment will justify the vendee in rescinding the contract and refusing
further deliveries. A later case, Simpson v. Crippins, L. R. 8 Q. B. x4, holds
that the failure to send the full quota for one month, although grounds for
compensation, will not justify a rescission of the entire contract. In this
country the decisions are equally conflicting. In some jurisdictions Hoare
v. Rennie has been affirmed while others have sustained Simpson v. Crippin.
In Pennsylvania the leading case on the subject Is Rugg and Bryan v.
Moore, xio Pa. 236. The contract was for a certain quantity of. corn to be
delivered in six car loads. Two loads had been received when the buyer
refused to pay draft until he received information as to the other loads.
The seller then regarded the contract as rescinded and refused to furnish
more corn. The buyer pays for second load and brings suit for damages
alleging as breach of contract, seller's refusal to deliver the remaining installments as per contract. The late Chief Justice Green in delivering the
opinion of the court said, "if it was the contract of the parlties that the corn
was to be paid for at each delivery, and plaintiff refused to pay for a delivery which had been accepted by him, without sufficient reason for such
refusal, he authorized the defendant to rescind, and -if
within a reasonable
time he exercised the right of recission, the contract was at an end and
plaintiff could not recover." This case seems to us to be analagous in
principle to the one under consideration.
The excuse of Ballantine that he was then unable to pay cash, is no ex
cuse at all. The contract was that Wood should furnish 5 bales of cotton
on the first day of each month, beginning with January 1, 1904, until all the
5o bales were delivered, and as part of the consideration Ballantine agreed
to pay cash on each delivery. His contract made it incumbent upon him
to have the cash to pay on each delivery, and his failure to pay each is as
much a breach of the contract as his refusal to have received an installment of
the goods when tendered would have been. Two days only elapsed before
Wood notified Ballantine that he intended to rescind the contract. Clearly,
therefore, he exercised his right to rescind in a reasonable time. We hold,
under the authority of Rugg and Bryan v. Moore, cited above, that Ballantihe's refusal to pay the seconid installment was such a breach as made it
possible for Wood to rescind the contract.
Having determined'this, let us consider whether Wood was justified in
selling the 45 bales, the entire amount of the goods contracted for, and
whether he is entitled to recover the difference between the contract price
and the price secured at the resale.
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Upon the failure of a vendee of personal property to receive and pay
for goods, the vendor may resell, and if the sale is bona fide and proper, he
may recover the difference between the price obtained and the contract
price: Kerr v. Shrader, i W. N. C. 33; Balt'o. Smelting Co. v. Carpet Co., 2
Sup. 555; Hoover, Seving & Co. v. Carpet Co. ii Sup. 636, Dustan v. McAndrew, 44 N. Y. 73; Van Horn v. Rucker, 33 Mo. 391. Whitney v. Boardman, 18 Mass. 242.
Had the contract been for the delivery of fifty bales of cotton, all to be
delivered ata certain date, payable on delivery, and had defendant refused
to accept the delivery of the fifty bales when due or had he refused to pay
on delivery, we apprehend that there would be no doubt but that plaintiff
would be entitled to recover the difference between the price secured at resale and contract price, provided no objeetion could be made to manner of
holding second sale.
It has been strongly urged by counsel for defendant that the right of
resale existed only as to the February installment, that damages cannot be
recovered for more than the one installment and that the right to damages
would accrue as each installment fell due.
We are unable to support this contention. When Wood gave notice to
Ballantine that he intended to sell the remaining 45 bales of cotton, the contract was at an end. Wood was to make no further deliveries nor could
Ballantine compel him to do so; Rugg and Bryan v. Moore, supra; Reybold
v. Voorhees, 30 Pa. i16. The contract being entirely at an end we see no
objection to his selling all the remaining bales and recovering the difference in this action, even though had the contract remained in force, deliveries under the contract were not to have been made until future dates.
We believe that the conclusion reached is supported by the following
authorities: Clark v. Phila. & Reading Coal Co., 16 Phila. 135, and Clark
v. Dill, 8 Sadler 164. In Clark v. the Phila. Reading Coal Co., the contract
was for 5ooo tons of iron rails at a certain price per ton, delivery to be in
five equal instalments in five consecutive months, payment to be made at
each delivery on receipt of invoice. After first delivery vendee failed and
was declared a bankrupt. Only 250 tons were paid for and vendor sells the
remainder of the 5ooo tons. He was allowed to recover the difference between contract price and price received at resale.
In Clark v. Dill, supra, the contract was for the purchase of two billiard
tables, payment to be in two instalments secured by promissory notes. The
court held "when the defendant refused to give note according to contract,
the plaintiff had either of two remedies:-he might treat the contract as
broken and sue for damages: or he might elect to treat the contract as subsisting and sue for the installments as they became due." In the present
case the plaintiff clearly elected to treat the contract as broken.
All the evidence tends to show that the resale was conducted in a fair
and proper manner. Ballantine received notification of the resale. The
sale was held within a reasonable time and there was sufficient advertisement. The fact that Wood purchased the 45 bales at the resale does not
militate against his case. There is no objection to the seller becoming the
purchaser at his own sale, if the sale is fairly conducted: Amer. & English
Ency. of Law, Vol. 24: Page 1143.
Judgment rendered for plaintiff for difference between contract price
and price received at resale, also for costs of resale.
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OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The contract for tie sale of 5o bales of cotton, was one, and not ten
contracts to sell, each 5 bales. In no correct sense, was it a severable contract. Cherry Valley Iron Works v. Florence Iron River Co., 12 C. C. A.
3o6; Iron Co. v. Naylor, 9 App. Cas. 434; Norrington v. Wright, 1i5 W. S.
188. The fact that the bales were to be delivered in parcels of five, each
parcel being separately paid for at the time of delivery, does not sever the
contract into ten.
When the second instalment was tendered on Feb. ist Balantine
stated, "he was then unable to pay cash." Wood thereupon declined to deliver that instalment, and he .tendered no succeeding ones. On the contrary
with striking promptitude, he, on Feb. 3 d informed Balentine that in lo
days, he could sell the 45 bales. This sale was made.
The learned court below has spoken of this as a rescession of the coltract. But to rescind the contract is to resolve to treat it as non-existent,
so far as future rights and duties are concerned. This action, which is for
damages for the breach of the contract, is an -emphatic negation of a rescission of it.
If Wood, sued by Balantine for not delivering the-instalments of cotton,
had alleged that for his failure to pay and receive the second instalment, he
had justifiablly rescinded, he would have acted consistently with rescission.
He would be attempting to prevent the enforcement of the contract by
Balentine. But, with no propriety of speech can it be said that Wood,
suing upon the contract, has, nevertheless rescinded it.
What he is really doing is, enforcing a modified performance of it on
the part of Balentine. Balentine should, by the contract, have paid for five
bales of cotton, at the beginning of each of ten months. But he should
likewise have received the cotton. He is sued for a part of the money he
contracted to pay, without getting more than five of the bales.
It may probably be conceded that the unreadiness of Balentine to pay
for the second instalment, justified Wood in regarding himself as liberated
from the duty of further performance, provided that he did not at the same
time intend to hold Balentine to a further performance. Reybold v. Voorhees, 30 Pa. i16; Rugg v. Moore, 11o Pa. 236, although some respectable
courts refuse to admit even this unless there was repudiation of the contract by Balentine, which his mere failure to pay for the February instalment
was not. Iron Co. v. Naylor, 9 App. Cases 434; Norrington v. Wright, I15
U.S. 188; Cherry Valley Iron Works v. Florence Iron River Co., 12 C.C.A.
3o6. But, while treating himself as not bound to tender eight of the io instalments of cotton, Wood is nevertheless seeking to compel Balentine to
pay for them. He has delivered them to another, without Ballentine's consent, and is loolfing to him for payment.
It may be that when Balentine was unable to pay for the five bales
tendered to him on Feb. ist, he authorized Wood otherwise to dispose of
them. Wood might have regarded them as Balentine's and sold them in
virtue of a kind of lien, looking to the latter for the difference between the
price brought thereat, and the contract price. He might doubtless regard
them as still his own, the title not passing back or having passed, as passing
to him, and, selling them, sue for the difference. Cf. Hooper & Co. v.
Carpet Co. ii Seeper. 634; Andrews v. Hoover, 8 N. 239; McCombs v. McKennan, 2 W. & S. 216; Guillon v. Earnshaw, 169 Pa. 463.
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But, there had been no default by Balentine, in respect to the remaining eight instalments. The time for the tender of them had not come. So
far as appears, if they had been tendered, they would have been received
and paid for. Why Wood had them so long before the time for delivering
them, and why he desired to sell them when prices were below the contract
price, since they might have risen before the time for delivery we may only
conjecture. We cannot agree that without the consent of Balentine, he
should sell cotton, which the latter was not bound for months to accept,
and then charge him with the difference between what, at this sale, made
before contractnal time has arrived for payment, he obtains, and the contract price. Wood, if he chose, might sell the second instalment, and hold
Balentine for the loss; he might in addition, refuse to regard himself as
bound to make any future deliveries; or, he might if he chose, make such
deliveries, when the contractual times came for making them. He could
not hold himself discharged from delivery according to the contract, and
yet make Balentine liable for the whole contract price. It is equitable to
compel the latter to bear the loss incident to the effort to obtain the payment in respect to which he had defaulted. It is inequitable to compel
him to pay down, in one lump the price of all the instalments, before they
are due, on pain of having them sold before the contract called for their
delivery, and for his payment of them, and of being obliged to replace any

loss.
Judgment reversed with

.f. d. n.

ALLEN v. SCOTT.

Consideration-Moral Obligation.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Scott owed $100 to one Snow. Allen told Snow that he wished to give
Scott a pleasant surprise and that he wished to pay his debt for him.
This was done. On Scott's learning of this he said he was glad that Snow
was paid but that he would not accept it as a gift from Allen. He expressly promised Allen to reimburse him in a short time. Two years have
elapsed and Allen having quarreled with Scott sues him on this promise.
Smith for plaintiff.
Davis for defendant.
WALLIS, J. We are of the opinion that the plaintiff cannot recover
in this action. Indeed in any other state than Pennsylvania the question
of recovery upon such a promise could scarce be considered. However,
as this State recognizes the moral obligation theory in the law of contracts,
and, as it is upon moral obligation as a consideration for the promise, that
the plaintiff bases his right of recovery, it becomes necesary to consider to
what extent if any, this theory may help the plaintiff.
It is a deplorable fact that the Supreme Court of this State has frequently laid down the doctrine, unqualifiedly, that moral obligation is a
sufficient consideration to support an express promise. Willing v. Peters
12, S. & R. 177; McPherson's admr. v. Rees, 2 P. & W. 521; Greeves v.
McAllister. 2 Bins. 590. In Greeves v. McAllister the Court says: "The
old rule, that an action will not lie where the .consideration is past has
received a rational explanation from the liberal ideas that actuate modern
courts of justice. Though the service has been rendered prior to the
promise, yet if the party be under a legal or a moral obligation to pay,
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the promise will bind him." From the confusion that is almost sure to
result from attempts to apply this rule, it would seem that the "ideas
that actuate modern courts of justice, are more 'liberal' than 'rational.'
This was said nearly a century ago (in 1809) and yet to-day we find this
same doctrine held.
In Hemphill v. McClimans, 24 Pa. 367, the Court says: "There is no
code of ethics which says that the duty of not abusing the confidence of
one who has honestly served you, is a void obligation upon the conscience.
This is not a question to be settled by metaphysics. All judicial casuisty
npon such subjects must be pernicious. We would be very sorry to tell
the defendant that the sense of justice which impelled her to promise
payment was a mistake. There is no decision on the point in this State.
There is no authority anywhere which requires us to mar the simplicity of
the plain rule, which says that a moral obligation is a sufficient consideration for a direct promise, and we affirm this to be a moral obligation, because the commonsense of all mankind affirms that it cannot be violated
without moral guilt." In Bailey v. Phil, 167 Pa. 569, Mitchell defines
moral obligation in law as "one which cannot be enforced by action, but
which is binding upon the party who incurs it, in conscience and according
to natural justice;" and again as "a duty-which would be enforced by
law were it not for some positive rule, which with a view to general benefit, exempts the party in that particular instance from legal liability."
But in any of these so-called definitions, do we find any clear line drawn
as to what will and what will not constitute a moral obligation? It is
merely repeating the idea in a less direct way and adds nothing to its
definiteness. The language of the Court when speaking of this doctrine is
always so vague as to make it impossible to determine what constitutes
legal moral obligation.
An exhaustive review of a score of the leading decisions on this doctrine, fail to produce any case analogous to the present one.
Surely, "all judicial casuistry upon such subjects must be pernicious."
Yet, we cannot say, too, as did the Court, supra, in two successive sentences, that "this is not a question to be settled by metaphysics." Any
mode of morals is a matter of casuistry and of metaphysics. And if the
Court is to determine the existence or the non-existence of a moral obligation, does it not follow that the judges becomes casuists and metaphysicians? Take the present case. Allen paid the debt of Scott, telling the
creditor at the time that he wished to give Scott a pleasant surprise and
that he wished to pay his debt for him. What were the circumstances of
the parties to the suit does not appear. And, yet, we think the motives
of the two men, and their respective financial condition, would be material and relevant in determining the question whether the payment of
Scott's debt by Allen, placed Scott under a moral obligation to refund the
money and accept Allen as his creditor. If it did not place him under
such an obligation, then, clearly, there can be no recovery. Now, it is
not difficult to imagine circumstances which would have placed Allen under a moral obligation to pay Scott'a debt for him. For instance, Scott
may be a poor man and Allen a rich one. The debt of Scott may have
been incurred solely io benefit Allen and he alone may have gotten the
benefit. And, so far as we know, this may have been actually the conditions.
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We must, therefore, hold, that the facts do not show the existence of
a moral obligation on the part of Scott; and it follows that there was no
consideration for the promise.
Judgment for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
Allen might have taken an assignment of Snow's claim against Scott,
and had he intended to make Scott repay him, would probably have done
so. When he paid Snow, he had no intention of demanding future repayment from Scott. There was an interval of time during which Snow
was no longer the creditor of Scott, and during which Allen was not his
creditor, for the mere fact that A pays C's debt to B, even with intention that C shall become his debtor, will not make C debtor. Much less
will C become A's debtor when A pays his debt without intention that he
shall.
After the lapse of this interval, Scott said that he could not accept
Allen's payment of Snow, as a gift, meaning doubtless, that he would
pay Allen what Allen had paid Snow. "He expressly promised Allen to
reimburse him in a short time." When he was about thus to promise,
he was under no legal obligation to pay Allen. Was he under a moral
obligation? Doubtless different persons would take a different view of
this question, but we ourselves are not ethically developed enough to realize that a gift creates a moral obligation to repay it; so to hold, would
virtually be to hold that there is a moral obligation to refuse a gift, for
when a gift is repaid it is no longer a gift. Some gifts, gifts from some
persons, under some circumstances of the donor and donee, it would be a
moral duty to decline, but it would be stupid to affirm a duty to decline
every gift.
aerhaps
the good service of Allen imposed a duty on Scott to be grateful, and if possible to assist Allen in any future need. The promise on
which Scott is sued is not a promise of this sort.
Even if there was a moral obligation, and the sense of it was the
cause of Scott's promise to repay Allen, we are unable to say that
the promise because of such a genesis, is legally enforceable. It is not
the policy of the state to compel performance of all or one half or one
tenth of the moral obligations, nor, of such moral obligations as the subject of them may be conscious of; nor of those, of the consciousness of
which vocal expression has been given, in promises to reimburse. Nor
is it the policy of the State to render performance of a promise compulsory because the promise was made, or because it emerged, from the recognition of a moral obligation, It is unnecessary to examine the cases
so contradictory, so illy bottomed in principle or logic, with which the
books of Pennsylvania abound. Cf. Article on Moral Consideration in
Pennsylvania, by Prof. McKeehan, 9 FORUM, 1.
It does not appear that Allen accepted the promise of Scott; that is,
that he intimated to Scott that he would look for performance, or even
that he intended to allow performance, should itbe tendered. Two years
having elapsed, a change of Allen's feelings towards Scott, from kindness
to resentment, now dictates his recurrence to the promise and his effort
to compel performance of it. We are unable to say that performance of
the promise of Scott ought legally to be compelled.
Judgment affirmed.
JOHN BEALS vs. ADAM THORPE.
Animals farae naturae-Acuirlng ownership by Chase.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
John Beale, a hunter, started a deer and a shot from his rifle inflicted
a mortal wound. While in hot pursuit of it he was stricken with apoplexy and died. Adam Thorpe coming along found the deer just dying,
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dispatched it, and carried it home. Beale's administrator having demanded the deer and being refused, sues for its value, $40.00.
Temko for plaintiff.
Hummel for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
DAVIS J.- 'Actual bodily seizure is not indispensable to acquiring a
right to or possession of wild animals. The mortal wounding of such a
beast, by one not abandoning his pursuit, may, with the utmost propriety
be deemed possession of him, since thereby the pursuer manifests an
unequivocal intention of appropriating the animal to his individual
use, has deprived him of his natural liberty, and brought him within
his certain control.
So, also, encompassiag and securing such animals with nets and toils or otherwise intercepting them in such a manner as to deprive them of their natural liberty and render escape impossible, may justly be deemed to give possession of them to those persons,
who, by their industry and labor, have used such means of apprehending
them." American and English Encyclopedia of Law, 2nd Vol. Page 342.
In Perison v. Post, 3 Cain (N. Y.) 175. Judge Tompkins held that
actual bodily seizure is not indispensable to acquire a right to or possession
of wild beasts, but that the mortal wounding by one, may with propriety,
be deemed possession of him, etc.
By the facts stated, we note that Beale pursued the deer, and when
he came within striking distance, he mortally wounded the same, thereby
rendering it helpless and bringing it within his control and power. The
Court is of the opinion that the unfortunate death of Beale was not an
abandonment of the pursuit, for at the time of Beale's death the suit
had come to an end, he having Inortally wounded and rendered the escape
of the deer impossible, before his death. The instant Beale wounded and
brought the deer within his control, it became his personal property.
Judgment for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The deer being ferae naturaewas originally the property of nobody;
at least was not the property of Beale. This action of replevin presupposes that it had become Beale's. Had it?
He had "started" it. He had shot it with his rifle, inflicting a mortal
wound. But the wound had not disabled it from running for Beale was
still in "hot pursuit," when the apoplexy arrested him. It is evident that
Beale never could have got actual, possession of the deer. But for the
intervening of Thrope, falling, in.the forest, it would have remained unclaimed, until death and decomposition had occurred. Beale's power over
the animal was not complete, when he had shot it. It might-conceivably
have escaped from him, for a mortally wounded animal may still~run considerable distances, and elude pursuit and capture. Even if its capture,
but for the untoward illness of Beale, would -have occurred, that illness is not a fact which can be eliminated. How can it matter whether the
obstacle to a complete capture is in the strength and speed'of 'the deer, or
in the sudden extinction of the person's power to chase and take?
Had Thrope intervened after Beale's chase had begun, but before the
infliction of the wound which in time became mortal, and killed and taken
the deer, he would have violated no right of Beale, that is, the starting
and pursuing of a wild animal does not give a property in it, as against
another who intercepts the chase and captures it. Pierson v. Post, 3
Caines, 175; Buster v. Newkerk, 20 Johns, 75. The additional fact that
Beale had mortally wounded the deer, he having by his apoplexy become
incapable of ever gaining actual control of it, did not give him this property.
If we concede that the infliction of the mortal wound gave a qualified
roperty in the deer, it was still liable to be lost by the escape of the
eer. That escape could occur by the agility of the deer, but no less by
the sudden paralysis or death of its pursuer.
The conclusion we reach does not accord with that of the learned
Court below. Cf. Pierson v. Post, 3 Carnes, 175; 2 Kents' Comm. 349; 2
Am. and Eng. Ency. 341. Judgment reversed.

